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Abstract: This study revisits the relationship between defence spending and economic 
growth using Keynesian model in Pakistan by applying ARDL bounds testing approach to 
cointegration for long run and error correction method for short span of time. Empirical 
evidence suggests a stable cointegration relationship between defence spending and 
economic growth. An increase in defence spending retards the pace of economic growth 
confirming the validation of Keynesian hypothesis in the country. Current economic 
growth is positively linked with economic growth in previous period while rise in non-
military expenditures boosts economic growth. Interest rate is inversely associated with 
economic growth. Finally, unidirectional causality running from military spending to 
economic growth is found.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The study revisits the impact of defence spending on economic growth using augmented 
Keynesian model in long-and-short runs in case of Pakistan. Existing literature highlights 
two main channels through which defence spending affects economic growth. On the one 
hand, in Keynesian view, an increase in military spending increases the aggregate demand 
by stimulating output, employment and hence economic growth. Additionally, an increase 
in human capital due to military spending through education and technological guidance 
seems to have positive spill-over effects and increases the expenditures on research and 
development activities for civilians. On the other hand, neoclassical model argues that an 
increase in military spending means shift of resources away from private sector resulting 
in reduced private spending. This seems to crowd-out both public and private sector 
investments which declines economic growth (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). The public 
sector uses resources inefficiently while private firms are relatively more concerned about 
the cost of production. Gupta et al. (2004) have empirically validated that low military 
expenditures are associated with high economic growth through increased capital 
formation.  
 
Studies focusing on high and low income countries have shown that higher military 
spending is associated with low investment, employment and hence with low rate of 
economic growth [Smith, (1977); Boretsky, (1975); Sivard, (1977); Atesoglu (2002), 
Ocal and Brauer (2007) and Smith and Tuttle (2008)]. In contrast, positive effect of 
defence spending on economic growth was also found by Benoit (1973);  Halicioglu 
(2003, 2004); Wijeweera and Webb (2009)  and Atesoglu, (2009) etc. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that empirical investigations regarding impact of defence expenditures on 
economic growth are mixed and is the main motivation for researcher to examine the 
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effect of military spending on economic in context of country case study using time series 
data in case of Pakistan.  
 
The current study is a valuable contribution to existing literature for four main reasons. 
Firstly, the study reinvestigates the impact of military spending on economic growth both 
for long run and short run using Keynesian model over the period of 1972-2009. 
Secondly, ARDL bounds testing approach is applied to examine cointegration among 
variables which is not used in the existing literature on military spending and economic 
growth in case of Pakistan. Thirdly, the study uses Ng-Perron (2001) unit root test which 
provides reliable and consistent results as compared to the other traditional unit root tests 
such as ADF, P-P and DF-GLS. Finally, VECM ganger causality is employed to detect 
the direction of causality between defence spending and economic growth. 
 
 The rest of study is organised as following: section-II contains the review of literature on 
relationship between defence spending and economic growth. Modelling framework and 
data is explained in section-III while section-IV explains the estimation strategy. The 
empirical evidence on relationship between defence spending and economic growth is 
discussed in section-V and conclusions and policy implications are drawn in final section.   
 
II. Literature Review 
The dawn of 1970s is marked with great attention of researchers to examine the impact of 
defence spending on economic growth. Benoit (1973, 1978) focused on this particular 
issue in his landmark studies and later on, many researchers investigated the relationship 
between defence spending and economic growth and provided mixed evidence1.   
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Aligned with the Keynesian theory, some researches concluded that defence expenditures 
stimulate economic growth by raising aggregate demand. These positive externalities may 
enhance economic output and hence economic growth [see for example, Kennedy, 
(1974); Whynes, (1979); Fredericksen and Looney, (1982); Stewart, (1991); Ward et al. 
(1991); Dunne et al. (2001) and Yildirim et al. (2005)]. Based on above theoretical and 
empirical evidence, it may be argued that a rise in military expenditures may be effective 
to improve the infrastructure, stimulate aggregate demand and to enhance the production 
level. Military spending further trains labour force by military skills to increase 
employment and absorb advanced technology to be used in production process, resulting 
in an increase in aggregate output which stimulates economic growth (MacNair et al. 
1995).   
 
The relationship between defence spending and economic growth was initially 
investigated by Benoit, (1973, 1978) and positive impact of military expenditures on 
economic growth through positive spill-over effects was validated. Later on, Kennedy 
(1974); Deger, (1986); Kollias, (1995); Sezgin, (1997, 1999, 2000) also investigated the 
effect of defence spending on economic growth and provided a support for empirical 
findings by Benoit (1973, 1978). The relationship between military spending and 
economic growth in case of Turkey and Greece has been examined by Sezgin, (2001) 
using time series approach. Their results showed positive effect of defence spending on 
economic growth not only in the long run but also for the short span of time. In the case 
of Turkey, Özsoy (2000) found no relationship between defence spending and economic 
growth. But, Halicioglu, (2003, 2004) used simple model of Atesoglu (2002) to examine 
the effect of military spending on aggregate output. The findings showed positive impact 
of military expenditures on aggregate output for Turkish economy.  
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Yildirm et al. (2005) explored the relationship between military spending and economic 
growth for OECD countries using dynamic panel data approach and indicated that an 
increase in military spending stimulates aggregate output. In case of Fiji Island, Narayan 
and Singh (2007) investigated the association between military spending and economic 
growth by including exports as a new variable in production function to examine the 
impact of military spending on economic growth within multivariate framework. They 
reported positive effect of defence spending on economic growth through exports-
enhancing affect2. Wijeweera and Webb, (2009) employed VAR analysis on four 
variables including real output, military spending, non-military expenditures and real 
interest rate for the Sri Lankan economy3. They also reported that military spending 
affects economic growth positively. Their results revealed that although a 1 percent 
increase in defence spending leads to 0.05 percent increase in economic growth. 
Whenever, economic growth is increased by 1.6 percent due to 1 percent increase in non-
military spending. Atesoglu (2009) showed positive effect of military spending on 
aggregate output by using augmented Keynesian model and latter on, Gupta et al. (2010) 
confirmed the findings by Atesoglu (2009) using Factor Augmented Vector 
Autoregressive (FAVAR) model for US economy and  concluded that shock of real 
military spending has positive impact on aggregate output.  
 
Literature also provides empirical evidence about the negative impact of military 
spending on economic growth [Deger and Smith, (1983); Fredericksen and Looney, 
(1983); Faini et al. (1984) and, Birdi and Dunne, (2002)] both for cross-section and time 
series data sets. For instance, in poor African economies, Lim (1983) found negative 
effect of military spending on economic growth. Cappelen et al. (1984) examined the 
effect of military expenditures on economic growth including manufacturing output and 
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investment spending in OECD countries. They found positive association between 
military expenditures and manufacturing sector output while investment expenditures are 
inversely linked with military spending while overall military expenditures seem to affect 
economic growth inversely with significance for three sub-groups. Similarly, Starr et al. 
(1984) pointed out an indirect channel affecting economic growth negatively by 
increasing military expenditures and concluded that inflation rises due to an increase in 
military expenditures and increased inflation retards economic growth.  
 
Atesoglu, (2002) investigated the role of military spending on the performance of national 
economy for the case of United States following the models developed by Romer, (2000) 
and Taylor, (2000). The empirical evidence revealed that reduction in military 
expenditures will improve the performance of US economy. For South African economy, 
Birdi and Dunne, (2002) investigated the impact of military spending on economic 
growth using model developed by Feder-Ram. Their findings indicated an inverse 
association between military spending and economic performance for short span of time 
with significant feed back effect. Karagol and Palaz, (2004) re-examined the association 
between defence spending and economic growth for Turkish economy using Johansen 
multivariate approach and confirmed cointegration between the variables. They reported 
that an increase in military spending slows down the rate of economic growth4. For Peru's 
economy, Klein (2004) conducted a study to investigate the influence of rising defence 
expenditures on economic growth and found inverse impact of military expenditures on 
the pace of economic growth. In 2006, Karagol (2006) explored the link between 
economic growth, defence spending and external debt in Turkey and reported that a rise 
in military spending is having inverse effect on economic growth by reducing possibilities 
of investment.  
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In case of United States, Smith and Tuttle, (2008) probed the relationship between 
military spending and economic growth based on Atesoglu, (2002) model and found the 
absence of positive impact of military spending on economic growth. Results indicated 
that military spending is inversely associated with aggregate output. Similarly, Tang 
(2008) examined the impact of military spending on economic growth in the context of 
Malaysian economy. The evidence by bounds testing approach indicated the negative 
effect of military spending on economic growth. In European case5, Mylonidis (2008) 
estimated regressions by using Barro's (1991) growth models between military spending 
and economic growth by including population growth and government expenditures on 
education as other determinants of growth. The empirical evidence revealed negative 
impact of military spending and population growth while positive effect of investment 
and education on economic growth.  
 
Most recently, Pieroni, (2009) examined the relationship between military spending and 
economic growth using cross-country data set. He noted that a rise in defence spending is 
retarding economic growth. Furthermore, Pieroni argued that relationship between 
military spending and economic growth may be non-linear and provided different results 
as compared to traditional approaches. Finally, Abu-Qarn (2010) revisited the relation 
between military spending and economic growth for Israeli-Arab conflict and concluded 
that high defence spending impedes the pace of economic growth6.     
 
In case of Pakistan, Tahir (1995) scrutinized the direction of causal relationship between 
military spending and economic growth for Pakistan and India using VECM granger 
causality in bivariate system. The results showed that military spending and economic 
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growth granger caused each other in both the countries and same inference was drawn by 
Khilji and Mahmood (1995). Moreover, Khilji and Mahmood (1995) found negative 
impact of defence spending on economic growth using three-equation model. Khan 
(2004) investigated the Military Keynesianism Hypothesis (MKH) and reported 
bidirectional causality between both the variables. Further, Khan concluded that Military 
Keynesianism Hypothesis does not hold true in case of Pakistan.  The findings by Khan 
(2004) may be biased due to occurrence of structural break in time series data as East 
Pakistan got independence and Bangladesh came into being in 1971.        
 
 
III. Modelling Framework and Data 
The development of empirical model to examine the relationship between military 
spending and economic growth started by Feder (1983) dividing economy into export and 
non-export sectors and latter on, Feder (1983) model was also used by Ram (1986, 1995), 
Biswas and Ram (1986) to investigate the effect of military spending on economic growth 
for 58 less developed economies. Ward et al. (1991) and Yildrin et al. (2005) also used 
Feder (1983) model to examine the impact of military spending on aggregate output for 
OECD countries.  
 
Following Romer (2000) and Taylor (2000), Atesoglu (2002) used his own derived 
macroeconomic model by replacing IS-LM and AD-AS models to examine the 
association between military spending and economic growth7 as given below:  
 
tttttt MEGEXICY ++++= ……. (1)                                                                   
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Where Y is real GDP or aggregate output, C is consumption in real terms, I is real 
investment, GE is real government expenditures on non-military sectors, X indicates real 
net exports of an economy or balance of trade. ME represents real military spending of an 
economy8. These variables are termed as exogenous variables and written as follows:  
 
)( ttt TYC −+= δβ ……. (2) 
tt YT λα += ……. (3) 
tt iRI −= ϕ  ……. (4) 
)ttt fRbYaX −−= ……. (5) 
 
Where real taxes and real interest rate are denoted by  tT  and tR  respectively. The present 
study follows Halicioglu, (2004) approach and real interest rate is considered as an 
exogenous variable9. Following above discussion, the empirical equation is modelled as10:     
 
ttttt IRGEMEGDP ελλλλ ++++= 4321 ……. (6) 
)])1(1/()[(1 ba +−−++−= λβϕδαβλ , )])1(1/[132 b+−−== λβλλ ,  
)])1(1/[()(4 bfi +−−−−= λβλ and 2λ , 3λ > 0, 4λ < 0.  
 
Where GDP is real GDP proxy for economic growth, ME denotes real military 
expenditures, GE shows real government non-military expenditures while IR represents 
real interest rate. The linear specification of model has been converted into log-linear 
specification, since log-linear specification provides more appropriate and efficient results 
as compared to simple linear functional form of model (see for details Shahbaz, 2010).  
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The data on real GDP, real military and real government non-military expenditure has 
been obtained from GOP (2008-09) 11. The statistical bulletin of SBP12 (2008-09) is used 
to collect the data on real interest rate. The study covers the period from 1972 to 2009.   
 
IV. Estimation Strategy  
Ng-Perron test is applied for unit root problem while ARDL bounds testing approach is 
used to examine the cointegration between the running variables in the model.  
 
Ng-Perron Test 
Recently developed Ng-Perron (2001) unit root test has been utilized to investigate the 
order of integration of the variables (Theoretical formation of Ng-Perron is based on 
Joseph and Sinha, 2007). The Ng-Perron unit test has good size and explanatory power 
than Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips and Perron (P-P). This test is particularly 
suitable for small sample data sets. Ng-Perron unit root test contains four unit root tests 
including Phillips-Perron (1988) ta ZandZ  , Bhargava (1986) R1 and ERS optimal point 
tests. These tests are based on GLS de-trend data ty∆ . First, let us define 
22
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ARDL Bounds Testing Approach for Cointegration 
Moreover, we have employed the autoregressive distributed lag model or ARDL bounds 
testing approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) as the most 
appropriate specification to carry out cointegration analysis among the economic growth, 
defence spending, government non-military expenditures and real interest rate. The 
bounds testing approach to cointegration has numerous advantages over traditional 
techniques of cointegration. The main merit lies in the fact that it can be applied 
irrespective of whether the variables are integrated of order I(0) or integrated of order 
I(1). Fortunately, ARDL bounds approach to cointegration is free of any problem faced 
by traditional techniques in the economic literature. Another merit is that, it has better 
properties for small sample data set. Moreover, a dynamic error correction model (ECM) 
can be derived from the ARDL model through a simple linear transformation (Banerrjee 
and Newman, 1993). The error correction model integrates the short-run dynamics with 
the long-run equilibrium without losing information about long-run. The ARDL bounds 
testing approach to cointegration involves estimating the unrestricted error correction 
method (UECM) of the ARDL model as follows:  
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Where 
o
α , 
o
β , 
o
φ ,
o
ϕ  and Tα , Tβ , Tφ , Tϕ are the drift components and time trends, and 
iµ  is assumed to be white noise error processes. The optimal lag structure of the first 
differenced regression is selected by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to ensure that 
serial correlation does not exist. Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulated two critical bounds (upper 
and lower critical bounds) to take the decision about the existence of long-run 
relationship among the running variables. The null hypotheses of no cointegration in 
equations 7-10 are 0: ==== IRGEMEGDPH ααααo , 0: ==== IRGEMEGDPH ββββo , 
0: ==== IRGEMEGDPH φφφφo  and 0: ==== IRGEMEGDPH ϕϕϕϕo  against alternate 
hypotheses of cointegration which is  0:1 ≠≠≠≠ IRGEMEGDPH αααα , 
0:1 ≠≠≠≠ IRGEMEGDPH ββββ , 0:1 ≠≠≠≠ IRGEMEGDPH φφφφ  and 
0:1 ≠≠≠≠ IRGEMEGDPH ϕϕϕϕ . Next step is to compare the calculated F-statistic with 
LCB (lower critical bound) and UCB (upper critical bound) tabulated by Pesaran et al. 
(2001). There is cointegration among the variables if calculated value of F-statistic is 
more than upper critical bound (UCB). If lower critical bound (LCB) is more than 
computed F-statistic then hypothesis of no cointegration may be accepted. Finally, if 
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calculated F-statistic is between lower and upper critical bounds then decision about 
cointegration is inconclusive.  
 
To establish the goodness of fit of the ARDL model, the diagnostic and the stability tests 
have also been conducted. The diagnostic test examines the serial correlation, functional 
form, normality of error term and heteroscedisticity associated with the model. The 
stability test is checked by applying the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) 
and the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ). 
 
Next step is to detect the direction of causal relationship between economic growth, 
military spending, government non-military expenditures and real interest by applying 
standard Granger causality test augmented with a lagged error-correction term. The 
Granger representation theorem suggests that there will be Granger causality in at least 
from one direction if there exists cointegration relationship among the variables provided 
that the variables are integrated of order one or I(1). Engle-Granger (1987) cautioned that 
if the Granger causality test is conducted at first difference through vector auto regression 
(VAR) method then it will be misleading in the presence of cointegration. Therefore, the 
inclusion of an additional variable to the VAR method such as the error correction term 
would help us to capture the long-run relationship. To this end, error correction term is 
involved in the augmented version of Granger causality test and it is formulated in a bi-
variate pth order vector error-correction model (VECM) which is as follows: 
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Where ∆ is the difference operator; 1−tECM is the lagged error-correction term derived 
from the long-run cointegrating relationship; and iii 321 ,, µµµ and i4µ  are serially 
independent random errors with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. The presence of 
a significant relationship in first differences of the variables provides evidence on the 
direction of the short-run causation while a significant t-statistic pertaining to the error 
correction term (ECM) proposes the presence of significant long-run causation. However, 
it should be kept in mind that the results of the statistical testing can only be interpreted in 
a predictive rather than in the deterministic sense. In other words, the causality has to be 
interpreted in the Granger sense. 
 
 
V. Empirical Estimation 
The main objective of paper is to re-investigate the impact of military expenditures on 
economic growth and direction of causality between military spending and economic 
growth in the case of Pakistan. A number of cointegration approaches such as Engle and 
Granger (1987), Johansen (1991, 1992) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), Stock and 
Watson (1993) and, Phillips and Moon (1999, 2001) are available to examine 
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cointegration between the variables13. The prerequisite of these tests for cointegration is 
that all variables in the model must have same order of integration14. ARDL bounds 
testing approach to cointegration is more advanced and flexible as compared to other 
traditional cointegration approaches. The autoregressive ditributive lag model can be 
applicable whether variables are integrated at I(0) or I(1) or I(1) / I(0). Đt shows that there 
is no need to find out the order of integration of variables to apply ARDL bounds testing. 
However, it is pointed out by Ouattara (2004) that there is a need to have informtaion 
about order of integration of the variables. The main assumption of ARDL model is that 
variables are inetgrated at I(1) or I(0) and no variable sholud be stationary beyond that 
integrating orders. Đf any variable is integrated at I(2) then the whole computation of F-
statistic for cointegartion becomes invalid. Therefore, in order to apply ARDL bounds 
testing approach to cointegration, it is necessary to have information about the order of 
integration of the variables.  
 
Traditional unit root tests such as ADF (Dicky and Fuller, 1979), P-P (Philip and Perron, 
1988) and DF-GLS (Elliot et al. 1996) are used to find out integrating order of the 
variables. But, conventional unit root tests seem to over-reject the null hypothesis when it 
is true and vice versa. To overcome this problem, we used Ng-Perron (2001) unit root 
test. This test is more powerful and reliable for small data set as compared to other 
traditional unit root tests and produces consistent results. The results of unit root test are 
reported in Table-1. 
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Table-1: Unit Root Estimation 
Ng-Perron at Level with Intercept and Trend 
Variables MZa MZt MSB MPT 
tGDPln  -4.20307 -1.3811 0.3285 20.9802 
tMEln  -3.2154 -1.2052 0.3748 26.9661 
tGEln  -5.8527 -1.7090 0.2920 15.5669 
tIRln  -8.7644 -2.0398 0.2327 10.5843 
Ng-Perron at 1st Difference  with Intercept and Trend 
tGDPln∆  -24.1666* -3.4679 0.1435 3.8189 
tMEln∆  -30.8187 * -3.8964 0.1264 3.1208 
tGEln∆  -17.1881*** -2.9202 0.1699 5.3696 
tIRln∆  -27.9289* -3.7181 0.1331 3.3713 
                                    Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
                                              respectively. 
 
 
The empirical evidence shows that all the variables have unit root problem at level. At 1st 
difference, GDP, ME, GE and IR are found to be stationary. This shows that variables in 
the model are having unique order of integration. In such circumstances, we can apply 
ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration to examine long run relationship between 
the variables of interest in the model. Before proceeding to two steps ARDL procedure, it 
is necessary to select appropriate lag length of variables and akaike information criteria 
(AIC) is used to select lag length. It is reported that computation of F-statistic seems to be 
sensitive with lag order of variables in the model (see Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010). The 
VAR results show that lag order 2 is appropriate15. The number of total regressions 
generated by following ARDL methodology is (4+1)2 = 25 in estimated equation-7. 
Table-2 reveals the results of F-statistic for cointegration. The empirical evidence 
indicates two cointegration vectors when ME and GE are dependent variables i.e. 
),,/( ttttME IRGEGDPMEF t and ),,/( ttttGE IRMEGDPGEF t . For both equations calculated 
F-statistics are 5.278 and 5.191 and greater than upper critical bound (5.039) at 10 percent 
level of significance.  
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Table-2: Cointegration Test: ARDL Bounds Test 
Estimated Model  F-Statistics Lag 
),,/( ttttGDP IRGEMEGDPF t  
),,/( ttttME IRGEGDPMEF t  
),,/( ttttGE IRMEGDPGEF t  
),,/( ttttIR GEMEGDPIRF t  
3.165 
5.278*** 
5.191*** 
2.113 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Estimated Model 2R  Adjusted- 2R  F-Statistics Durban Watson  
),,/( ttttGDP IRGEMEGDPF t  0.79820 0.55317 3.257** 2.283 
),,/( ttttME IRGEGDPMEF t  0.71432 0.36742 2.059*** 2.376 
),,/( ttttGE IRMEGDPGEF t  0.80145 0.56035 3.324** 1.915 
),,/( ttttIR GEMEGDPIRF t  0.65814 0.27070 1.698 2.149 
Note: ** and *** denotes significance at the 5% and 10% level comparing with critical bounds generated 
by Turner (2006).  
 
The existence of cointegrating vectors confirms the long run relationship between GDP, 
ME, GE and IR i.e. real GDP, real military spending, government non-military 
expenditures and interest rate over the period of 1972-2009. The existence of long run 
relationship among the variables helps us to find out partial effects of military spending, 
government non-military expenditures and real interest rate on economic growth in case 
of Pakistan. Empirical evidence reported in Table-3 indicates that current economic 
growth is positively affected by economic growth in previous period. It is concluded that 
a 1 percent increase in economic growth in current period will raise economic growth by 
0.8895 percent in future. The relationship between defence spending and economic 
growth is negative and significant at 5 percent. It implies that a 1 percent increase in 
defence spending will decline economic growth by 0.4515 percent. At this point, we can 
compare our results with Khilji and Mahmood (1997) who reported inverse impact of 
military spending on economic growth.  
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Table-3: Long Run Elasticities 
Dependent Variable = tGDPln  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
Constant 0.7188 0.4765 1.5084 
1ln −tGDP  0.8895 0.0270 32.9158* 
tMEln  -0.4515 0.1912 -2.3607** 
tGEln  0.1298 0.0220 5.8988* 
tIRln  -0.0418 0.0114 -3.3677* 
R-Squared = 0.9888 
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.9873 
S.E. of Regression = 0.0311 
Akaike info Criterion = -3.9688 
Schwarz Criterion = -3.7466 
Log Likelihood = 74.4542 
F-Statistic = 662.8248 
Prob(F-statistic) = 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson = 1.4876 
Diagnostic Tests  Statistics 
J-B Normality test 2.0692 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test [1] 1.8188, [2] 2.0671 
ARCH LM test [1] 0.1932, [2] 0.3322 
White Heteroscedisticity  0.9561 
Ramsey RESET 2.9494*** 
CUSUM Stable** 
CUSUMsq Stable** 
                              Note: * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
 
The coefficient estimates are much different due to different time spans used in the 
studies. However, our empirical evidence is consistent with the findings by Atesoglu 
(2002) for USA, Karagol and Palaz, (2004) for Turkey, Smith and Tuttle, (2008) for USA 
and Keller et al. (2009) for OECD countries who found inverse relationship between 
defence spending and economic growth. The impact of government non-military 
spending on economic growth is positive and it is statistically significant at 1 percent 
level of significance. It is found that a 5 percent increase in non-military expenditures by 
government raises economic growth by 0.649 percent. The findings are consistent with 
existing defence economics literature including Atesoglu (2002) for United States, 
Halicioglu, (2004) for Turkish economy, Yildirm et al. (2005) for Middle Eastern 
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countries, Tang (2008) for Malaysia and, Wijeweera and Webb, (2009) for Sri Lanka. 
Finally, real interest rate is inversely correlated with economic growth. It is documented 
that a 1 percent increase in real interest rate is linked with 0.0418 percent decline in 
economic growth. These findings are consistent with the empirical results of Atesoglu 
(2002), Halicioglu, (2004) and, Wijeweera and Webb, (2009).  
 
The lower portion of Table-3 reflects that long run model passes all diagnostic tests 
against serial correlation, autoregressive conditional heteroscedisticity, non-normality of 
residual term, white heteroscedisticity and misspecification of model. The long run 
estimates are stable because diagrams of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ are lying between 
critical bounds. To examine the short run impact of independent variables including 
lagged error term ECM version of OLS is used. The results of short run model are 
reported in Table-4. The coefficient of lagged error term or 1−tECM  indicates the speed 
of adjustment from short span of time towards long run equilibrium path is significantly 
negative. It is suggested by Bannerjee et al. (1998) that significance of lagged error term 
further validates the established long run relationship among the variables. Our empirical 
exercise indicates that coefficient of 1−tECM  is -0.6057 and significant at 5 percent. It 
implies a 60.57 percent of disequilibrium from the current year's shock seems to converge 
back to the long run equilibrium in the next year.  
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Table-4: Short Run Elasticities 
Dependent Variable = tGDPln∆  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
Constant -0.0010 0.0058 -0.1815 
1ln −∆ tGDP  0.7954 0.1454 5.4671* 
tMEln∆  -0.2147 0.7151 -0.3002 
tGEln∆  0.0550 0.0256 2.1512** 
tIRln∆  -0.0406 0.0146 -2.7739* 
1−tECM  -0.6057 0.2333 -2.5959** 
R-Squared = 0.5358 
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.4529 
S.E. of Regression = 0.0275 
Akaike info Criterion = -4.1840 
Schwarz Criterion = -3.9146 
Log Likelihood = 77.1285 
F-Statistic = 6.4639 
Prob(F-statistic) = 0.0004 
Durbin-Watson = 2.1083 
Diagnostic Tests  Statistics 
J-B Normality test 0.9678 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test [1] 0.8106, [2] 1.7890 
ARCH LM test [1] 0.9308, [2] 0.4728 
White Heteroscedisticity  1.1003 
Ramsey RESET 1.6688 
CUSUM Stable** 
CUSUMsq Stable** 
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
 
In the short run, economic growth is affected positively by 0.7954 percent in future by 1 
percent rise in economic growth in current period. The relationship between defence 
spending and economic growth is negative but it is insignificant. It is documented that a 1 
percent increase in military spending will lower economic growth by 0.2147 percent in 
short span of time but it is statistically insignificant. There is positive association between 
government non-military expenditures and economic growth. The results indicate that a 1 
percent rise in government non-military spending shows very minimal effect on 
economic growth i.e. 0.0550 percent. Finally, link between real interest rate and 
economic growth is negative and significant at 1 percent significance level. The 
coefficients of long run and short run for real interest rate are more or less the same. 
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For the short run model, diagnostic tests also indicate that there is no evidence of serial 
correlation and error term is normally distributed. The autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedisticity and white heteroscedisticity are not found. Finally, short run model is 
well specified as confirmed by Ramsey RESET test. The stability of long run and short 
run estimates is checked by applying the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the cumulative 
sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests. The results of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ reveal that both 
short run and long run estimates are stable and reliable. 
 
Long run model 
Figure 1 
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals 
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The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
 
 
Figure  2   
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals 
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The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
 
Short run model 
Figure 3 
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals 
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The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
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The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
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The VECM and Direction of Causality between Defence Spending and Economic Growth 
The presence of cointegrating among the variables leads us to perform the Granger causality test to provide a clearer picture for policymakers to 
formulate defence and economic policies by understanding the direction of causality between defence spending and economic growth. It is 
reported that variables are cointegrated for long run relationship and this leads us to apply VECM framework to detect direction of causality 
between the variables both for short- and short-runs. The results of Granger causality test are reported in Table-5. 
 
Table-5: The Results of Granger Causality  
Type of Granger causality 
Short-run Long-run  Joint (short- and long-run) 
tGDPln∆  tMEln∆  tGEln∆  tIRln∆  1tECT −  1,ln −∆ tt ECTGDP  1,ln −∆ tt ECTME  1,ln −∆ tt ECTGE  1,ln −∆ tt ECTIR  
Dependent 
variable 
F-statistics [p-values]  [t-statistics] F-statistics [p-values] 
tGDPln∆  – 
2.7751*** 
[0.0816] 
0.5497 
[0.5839] 
3.5256** 
[0.0448] 
–0.04757** 
[-2.0951] – 
5.0604*** 
[0.0071] 
2.2172 
[0.1110] 
3.2058*** 
[0.0403] 
tMEln∆  
1.7899 
[0.1877] – 
0.8173 
0.4530] 
0.5634 
[0.5763] 
-0.0543 
 [-1.0155] 
2.1834 
[0.1151] – 
1.1099 
[0.3637] 
0.8882 
[0.4607] 
tGEln∆  
0.0767 
[0.9263] 
3.0751*** 
[0.640] – 
5.3668** 
[0.0115] 
-0.3752* 
[-2.7935] 
2.7262*** 
[0.0654] 
7.6500* 
[0.0000] – 
6.2417* 
[0.0026] 
tIRln∆  
3.2052** 
[0.0577] 
0.7267 
[0.4934] 
0.0540 
[0.9447] – 
-0.4838*** 
[-1.8536] 
4.6518** 
[0.0102] 
3.3255** 
[0.0358] 
4.5179** 
[0.0107] – 
  Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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The causality relation can be divided into short- and long-run causation as variables are 
cointegrated. The long run causality is indicated by the significance of coefficient of the 
one period lagged error-correction term 1tECT −  in equations (11) to (14) using t-test. The 
short run causality can be detected by the joint significance of LR test of the lagged 
explanatory variables in the equation. Our empirical results suggest that the 1tECT − is 
having negative sign and statistically significance in all VECM equations except in 
equation-12. The results show unidirectional causal relationship running from military 
spending to economic growth in short run as well in long run over the period of 1972-
2009. It is concluded on the basis of our empirical exercise that rise in defence 
expenditures will inversely granger cause economic growth. These findings are 
contradictory to those of Tahir (1995), Khilji and Mahmood (1997) and, Khan (2004) for 
Pakistan who reported bidirectional causality between the variables which may be biased 
and inconsistent due to different data span used in the studies. However, our empirical 
evidence is consistent with the existing defence economic literature such as Abu-Bader 
and Abu-Qarm (2003) for Egypt, Israel and Syria; Karagol and Palaz, (2004) and Özsoy 
(2008) for Turkey; Tang (2008) for Malaysia and Smith and Tuttle, (2008) for United 
States.  
 
Bidirectional causal relationship is found between economic growth and government non-
military spending in long run. Our findings corroborate with the view by Abu-Bader and 
Abu-Qarm (2003) who reported that a rise in government non-military spending will 
stimulate the pace of economic growth and in turn, government allocates more resources 
to productive and efficient ventures to sustain the rate of economic growth. There is also 
bidirectional causal relation between economic growth and interest rate. It can be inferred 
on the basis of our findings that a rise in interest rate will granger cause economic growth 
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inversely through investment-declining effect while economic growth inversely granger 
causes interest rate through real money balances enhancing-effect. The unidirectional 
causality is reported to be running from interest rate and defence spending to government 
non-military expenditures in short- and long-runs. This shows that an increase in interest 
rate will increase the rate of inflation that makes government non-military spending less 
efficient and expensive. The causality running from defence spending to government non-
defence spending lends the support for popular perception that a rise in defence 
expenditures is generally accompanied with the decline in development expenditures. 
Finally, there is unidirectional causality is found running from defence spending and 
government non-military expenditures to interest rate in long run. Overall, our results 
report that military spending granger causes economic growth which indicates that high 
military spending is retarding economic growth both for short- and long-runs.     
 
 
VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The allocation of military and non-military expenditures for developing economies is one 
of the major policy issues which can direct the pace of economic growth. Therefore, the 
issue of military spending-growth nexus has been investigated using cross-section and 
time series data analysis across developed, developing and least developed economies by 
the researchers frequently. Various approaches including classical, neoclassical and 
Keynesian were used to explore the nature of relationship between defence spending and 
economic growth and produced mixed results. Using time series data set and ARDL 
bounds testing approach to cointegration, relationship between military spending and 
economic growth in the case of Pakistan has been re-investigated over the period of 1972-
2009.  
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The empirical exercise has confirmed cointegration between economic growth, military 
spending, government spending and interest rate. Moreover, results have indicated 
negative effect of military spending on economic growth for Pakistan's economy. These 
findings are consistent with the existing literature such as Khilji and Mahmood, (1997); 
Atesoglu, (2002); Karagol and Palaz, (2004); Smith and Tuttle, (2008); Tang, (2008) and 
Keller et al. (2009). The estimated coefficient of government non-military spending is 
showing positive impact on economic growth supporting the views of Halicioglu, (2004); 
Yildirm et al. (2005) and Wijeweera and Webb, (2009). The inverse relationship is also 
witnessed between real interest rate and economic growth and is consistent with findings 
of Halicioglu, (2004). Finally, unidirectional causal relationship running from military 
spending to economic growth has been found. 
 
In the background of our empirical investigation, it can be highlighted that both Pakistan 
and India are strategically important nuclear states, and their cordial mutual relationship 
is important for the South East Asian region as well as the global economy and peace. 
Therefore, it is highly appropriated if both the governments initiate bilateral talks to 
develop mutual confidence and harmony to fight against terrorism and poverty. The 
population size and population growth rate of both the countries do not permit them to 
invest such a huge chunk of their annual budgets on their military spending. It is 
strategically important for them to start dialogue to reach at a consensus for peace and 
prosperity by reducing their military size and expenditures. This may result in reducing 
the arms race between Pakistan and India which will shift resources to developmental 
projects and stimulate the pace of economic growth.   
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In the context of policy implications for Pakistan, defence expenditures are escalating due 
to the mutiny and unrest as a consequence of terrorism, violence and carnage. Terrorism 
is instigated and noticed in tribal areas like FATA and others areas in Pakistan where per 
capita income appears to be very low. It can be highlighted that the terrorism in these 
areas may be due to low expenditure on the basic needs of health, education and 
infrastructure. Therefore, the Government of Pakistan should initiate development 
projects in the areas with low per capita income, scarcity of resources, penury, and abject 
poverty by reducing military spending. Employment generating activities should be 
supported and emphasis should be placed on schooling, edification and civilization. 
Currently, industries are established in Sind, especially in Karachi, and Punjab such as 
Gujranwala, Sailkot, Faisalabad and Wazirabad. Government of Pakistan should pay 
special attention to establish industries in less developed areas like FATA and other tribal 
areas to increase employment opportunities for the people of that area which will help to 
enhance their living standards. It will be possible by cutting down the defence spending 
and shift these resources to production ventures to sustain economic growth, reduce 
poverty and decline income inequality in the country.  
 
We used Keynesian approach to examine the impact of military spending on economic 
growth using time series for Pakistan and this approach has its own limitations indicated 
by Dunne et al. (2005). The study can be extended for future research by including net 
exports, capital, labour (Dunne et al. 2005) and, natural resources and technology (Dunne 
and Uye, 2009) for more efficient and consistent results following endogenous growth 
model. Agostino et al. (2010)  pointed out that modified endogenous growth model may 
provide more help in investigating the effect of military spending on economic growth by 
including the above mentioned  variables.  
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Footnotes 
1. For example see Choudhury, (1991); DaKurah et al. (2001); Atesoglu, (2002); 
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarm, (2003); Cuaresma and Reitschuler, (2003); Halicioglu, 
(2004); Yildirim et al. (2005); Bas, (2005); and Kollias et al. (2007). 
2. Military spending increases exports and exports lead the rate of ecnomic growth. 
3. Lee and Chen (2007) also concluded that defence spending stimulate economic 
growth in OECD and Non-OECD countries. 
4. Keller et al. (2009) pointed out very good issue on military draft and economic 
growth for OECD countries. They concluded that military draft is associated with 
high recruitment of their army personals. The large size of military draft means 
high resources are required to meet their demands. This indicates the distortions of 
both human and physical capital in an economy. This big draft of military will 
lower aggregate demand and hence lower the output level. This channel indicates 
negative impact of military draft on economic performance in OECD countries. 
5. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
6. Inverse impact of defence spending on economic growth is for Jordan, Syria and 
Arab while positive effect is found for Egypt. 
7. Atesoglu (2002) extended new macroeconomic model by including military 
expenditures. 
8. Formation of empirical model is totally based on Halicioglu, (2004). 
9. For more details see (Atesoglu, 2002 and Halicioglu, 2004) 
10. Atesoglu, (2002) has used many other additional equations to explain impact of 
military expenditures on aggregate output for the case of United States with the 
help of new macroeconomic model but ignored the effect of real interest on 
aggregate output (Halicioglu, 2004). 
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11. Government of Pakistan 
12. State Bank of Pakistan 
13. Engle–Granger’s approach seems to produce less satisfactory when one 
cointegrating vector is present in multivariate case (Seddighi et al. 2000). 
14. There are several factors that cause structural changes such as change in economic 
policies, financial or economic crisis, and institutional change in their structure. 
15. The VAR lag length selection results are not reported but available upon request 
from authors. 
 
References  
1. Abu-Bader, S. and Abu-Qarm A. (2003) Government Expenditures, Military 
Spending and Economic Growth: Causality Evidence from Egypt, Israel and 
Syria. Journal of Policy Modelling 25(6-7), pp. 567-583. 
2. Abu-qarn, A. S. (2010) The Defence-Growth Nexus Revisited: Evidence from the 
Israeli-Arab Conflict. Defence and Peace Economics 21(4), pp. 291-300. 
3. Atesoglu, H. S. (2002) Defense Spending Promotes Aggregate Output in the 
United States: Evidence from Cointegration Analysis. Defence and Peace 
Economics 13 (1), pp. 55-60. 
4. Atesoglu, H. S. (2009) Defense Spending and Aggregate Output in the United 
States. Defence and Peace Economics 20(1), pp. 21-26. 
5. Banerjee, A. and Newman, A. (1993) Occupational Choice and the Process of 
Development. Journal of Political Economy 101(2), pp. 274-298.  
6. Bannerjee, A., J. Dolado and Mestre, R. (1998). Error-correction Mechanism 
Tests for Cointegration in Single Equation Framework. Journal of Time Series 
Analysis 19(3), pp. 267-283. 
 30 
7. Barro, R. J., (1991) Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106(2), pp. 407-443. 
8. Bas, M. A. (2005) Military Spending, Investment and Economic Growth: 
Relaxing The Linearity Assumption, Working Paper, University of Rochester 1-
36.  
9. Benoit, E. (1978) Growth and Defense in Developing Countries. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 26 (2), pp. 271-287. 
10. Benoit, E., (1973) Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. 
Boston: Heath and Co., Lexington Books. 
11. Bhargava, A. (1986) On the Theory of Testing for Unit Roots in Observed Time 
Series. The Review of Economic Studies 53(3), pp. 369-384. 
12. Birdi, A. and Dunne, J. P. (2002) An Econometric Analysis of Military Spending 
and Economic Growth in South Africa. Chapter 9 in Jurgen Brauer and J Paul 
Dunne (eds) (2002) "The Economics of Military Expenditures, Arms Production 
and Trade in Developing Countries". Palgrave. 
13. Biswas, B. and Ram, R. (1986) Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in 
Less Developed Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 34(2), pp. 361–372.  
14. Biswas, B. and Ram, R., (1986) Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in 
Less Developed Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 34(2), pp. 361-372. 
15. Boretsky, M., (1975), Trends in U.S. Technology: A Political Economist’s View. 
American Scientist 63(70), pp. 70-82.  
 31 
16. Cappelen, A., Gleditsch, N. P and Bjerkholt, O. (1984) Military Spending and 
Economic Growth in the OECD Countries. Journal of Peace Research 21(4), pp. 
361–373. 
17. Chowdhury, A. R. (1991) A Causal Analysis of Defense Spending and Economic 
Growth. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35(1), pp. 80–97. 
18. Cuaresma, J. C and Reitschuler, G. (2004) A Non-linear Defence-Growth Nexus? 
Evidence from the US Economy. Defence and Peace Economics 15(1), pp. 71-82. 
19. d'Agostino, G., Pieroni, L and Dunne, J. P. (2010). Assessing the Effects of 
Military Expenditure on Growth. University of the West of England, Department 
of Economics, Discussion Papers 1012. 
20. Dakurah, A.H., Davies, S.P. and Sampath, R. K. (2001) Defense Spending and 
Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Causality Analysis. Journal of 
Policy Modelling 23(6), pp. 651–658.  
21. Deger, S. (1986) Economic Development and Defense Expenditures. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 35(1), pp. 179-196. 
22. Deger, S. and Smith, R. (1983) Military Expenditure and Growth in less 
Developed Countries. Journal of Conflict Resolution 27(2), pp. 335–353. 
23. Dejong, D.N., Nankervis, J.C., Savin, N. E. (1992) Integration versus Trend 
Stationarity in Time Series. Econometrica 60(2), pp. 423-433. 
24. Dickey, D and Fuller, W. A. (1979) Distribution of the Estimates for 
Autoregressive Time Series with Unit Root. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 74(366), pp. 427-431. 
25. Dickey, D. A and Fuller, W. A (1981) Likelihood Ratio Statistics for 
Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root. Econometrica 49(4), pp. 1057-
1072. 
 32 
26. Dunne, J. P, Nikolaidou, E. and Smith, R. (2002) Military Spending Investment 
and Economic Growth in Small Industrialising Economies. The South African 
Journal of Economics 70(5), pp. 789-790. 
27. Dunne, J. P. and Uye, M. (2009) Military Spending and Development. University 
of the West of England, Department of Economics, Discussion Papers no. 0902. 
28. Dunne, J. P., Nikolaidoua, E. and Vougas, D. (2001) Defence Spending and 
Economic Growth: A Causal Analysis for Greece and Turkey. Defence and Peace 
Economics 12(1), pp. 5–26. 
29. Dunne, J. P., Smith, R and Willenbockel, D. (2005) Models of Military 
Expenditure and Growth: A Critical Review. Defence and Peace Economics 
16(6), pp. 449-461. 
30. Elliot, G., Rothenberg, T. J., Stock, J. H. (1996) Efficient Tests for an 
Autoregressive Unit Root. Econometrica 64(4), pp. 813-836. 
31. Engle, RF and Granger, C. W. J. (1987) Cointegration and Error Correction 
Representation: Estimation and Testing. Econometrica 55(2), pp. 251-276. 
32. Faini, R., Annez, P. and Taylor, L. (1984) Defense Spending, Economic Structure, 
and Growth: Evidence among Countries and over time. Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 32(3), pp. 487–498. 
33. Feder, G. (1982) On Exports and Economic Growth. Journal of Development 
Economics 12 (1/2), pp. 59–73. 
34. Feridun, M and Shahbaz, M. (2010) Fighting Terrorism: Are Military Measures 
Effective? Empirical Evidence from Turkey. Defence and Peace Economics 21 
(2), pp. 193-205. 
 33 
35. Fredericksen, P.C. and Looney, R. E. (1982) Defense Expenditures and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence. Journal of 
Economic Development 7(1), pp. 113-124. 
36. GoP (2008-09), Economic Survey of Pakistan, published by Ministry of Finance, 
Islamabad. Pakistan. 
37. Gupta, S., Clements, B., Bhattacharya, R., and Chakravarti, S. (2004) Fiscal 
Consequences of Armed Conflict and Terrorism in Low and Middle Income 
Countries. European Journal of Political Economy 20(2), pp. 403-421.  
38. Gupta. R, Kabundi. A and Ziramba, E. (2010) The Effect of Defense Spending on 
the US Output: A Factor Augmented Vector Autoregression (FAVAR) Approach. 
Defence and Peace Economics 21(2), pp. 135-147. 
39. Halicioglu, F. (2003) An Econometrical Analysis of Effects of Aggregate Defence 
spending on Aggregate Output, METU International Conference in Economics/ 
VII September 6-9, 2003, Ankara, Turkey. 
40. Halicioglu, F. (2004) Defense Spending and Economic Growth in Turkey: An 
Empirical Application of new Macroeconomic Theory. Review of Middle East 
Economics and Finance 2(3), pp. 193-201. 
41. Harris, R., and Sollis, R. (2003). Applied Time Series Modelling and Forecasting, 
Wiley, West Sussex.  
42. Johansen, S. (1991) Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegrating Vectors 
in Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models. Econometrica 59(6), pp. 1551–1580. 
43. Johansen, S. (1992) Cointegration in partial systems and the efficiency of single-
equation analysis. Journal of Econometrics 52(3), pp. 389-402.  
 34 
44. Johansen. S and Juselius, K (1990) Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Inference on Cointegration with Applications to the Demand for Money. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 52(2), pp. 169-210. 
45. Joseph, M and Sinha, D. (2007) Does Black’s Hypothesis for Output Variability 
Hold for Mexico?, MPRA Paper 4021, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
46. Karagol, E. (2006). The Relationship between External Debt, Defence 
Expenditures and GNP Revisited: The Case of Turkey. Defence and Peace 
Economics 17(1), pp. 47-57. 
47. Karagol. E and Palaz, S. (2004) Does Defence Expenditure Deter Economic 
Growth in Turkey? A Cointegration Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics 
15(3), pp. 289-298. 
48. Keller, K ., Poutvaara, P and Andreas, W. (2009) Military Draft and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries. Defence and Peace Economics 20(5), pp. 373-393. 
49. Kennedy, G. (1974). The Military in the Third World, Duckworth, London. 
50. Khan, M-H. (2004) Defence Expenditure and Macroeconomic Stabilization: 
Causality Evidence from Pakistan. SBP Working Paper Series 6, 1-17. 
51. Khilji, N. M and Mahmood, A. (1997) Military Expenditures and Economic 
Growth in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review 36(4), pp. 791-808. 
52. Klein, T. (2004) Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: Peru 1970-1996. 
Defence and Peace Economics 15 (3), pp. 275-288.  
53. Kollias, C. G. (1995). Preliminary Findings on the Economic Effects of Greek 
Military Expenditure. Applied Economics Letters 2(1), pp. 16-18. 
54. Kollias, C., Mylonidis, N. and Paleologou, S. (2007) A Panel Data Analysis of the 
Nexus between Defence Spending and Growth in The European Union. Defence 
and Peace Economics 18(1), pp. 75-85. 
 35 
55. Laurenceson, J and Chai, J. C. H. (2003) Financial Reform and Economic 
Development in China, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar. 
56. Lee, C-C and S-T, Chen. (2007) Do Defence Expenditures Spur GDP? A Panel 
Analysis from OECD and Non-OECD Countries. Defence and Peace Economics 
18(3), pp. 265-280. 
57. Lim, D. (1983) Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed 
Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change 31(2), pp. 377–384. 
58. MacKinnon, J. G. (1996) Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and 
Cointegration Tests. Journal of Applied Economics 11(6), pp. 601–618. 
59. MacNair, E., Murdoch, C and Sandler, T. (1995) Growth and Defense: Pooled 
Estimates for the NATO Alliance, 1951-1988. Southern Economic Journal 61(3), 
pp. 846–860. 
60. Mueller, M. J and Atesoglu, H. S. (1993) Defense Spending, Technological 
Change and Economic Growth in the United States. Defence and Peace 
Economics 4(3), pp. 259–269. 
61. Mylonidis, N. (2008) Revisiting the Nexus between Military Spending and 
Growth in the European Union. Defence and Peace Economics 19(4), pp. 265-
272. 
62. Narayan, P. K and Singh, S. (2007) Modelling the Relationship between Defense 
Spending and Economic Growth for the Fiji Islands. Defence and Peace 
Economics 18(4), pp. 391-401. 
63. Ng, S and Perron, P. (2001) Lag Length Selection and the Construction of Unit 
Root Test with Good Size and Power. Econometrica 69(6), pp. 1519-1554. 
 36 
64. Ocal, N and Brauer, J. (2007) Asymmetric Effects of U. S Military Expenditure 
on U. S Aggregate Output, Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, 
Augusta State University. 
65. Ouattara, B. (2004) Foreign Aid and Fiscal Policy in Senegal, University of 
Manchester, Manchester, UK. 
66. Özsoy, O. (2008) Defence Spending and The Macroeconomy: The Case of 
Turkey. Defence and Peace Economics 19(3), pp. 195-208. 
67. Ozsoy, O., 2000, The Defence Growth Relation: Evidence from Turkey. In: The 
Economics of Regional Security: NATO, the Mediterranean, Southern Africa, 
edited by Jurgen Brauer and Keith Hartley (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers), pp. 139–159. 
68. Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y. and Smith, R. J. (2001) Bounds Testing Approaches to 
the Analysis of Level Relationships. Journal of Applied Econometrics 16(3), pp. 
289-326. 
69. Phillips, P C B and Moon, H. R. (2001) Nonstationary Panel Data Analysis: An 
Overview and Some Recent Developments. Econometric Reviews 19(3), pp. 263-
286. 
70. Phillips, P. C. B and P. Perron (1988) Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series 
Regression. Biometrika 75(2), pp. 335-346. 
71. Pieroni, L. (2009) Military Expenditure and Economic Growth. Defence and 
Peace Economics 20(4), pp. 327-339. 
72. Ram, R. (1986) Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and 
some Evidence from Cross-section and Time-series Data. American Economic 
Review 76(1), pp. 191-203.  
 37 
73. Ram, R. (1995) Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth. In Handbook of 
Defense Economics, Vol 1, edited by K. Hartley and T. Sandler. Oxford: Elsevier, 
251–273. 
74. Romer, D. (2000) Keynesian Macroeconomics without the LM Curve, NBER 
Working Paper no. 7461.  
75. Sandler, T. and Hartley, K. (1995) Defence Economics. Oxford University Press.  
76. SBP (2008-09), Statistical Bulletin of State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi. Pakistan 
77. Sezgin, S. (1997) Country Survey X: Defence Spending in Turkey Defence and 
Peace Economics 8(4), pp. 381-409. 
78. Sezgin, S. (1999) Defence Expenditure and Economic Growth in Turkey and 
Greece: A Disaggregated Analysis, Paper presented at the Arms Trade, Security, 
and Conflict Conference, Middlesex University Business School, London, June 
11–12. 
79. Sezgin, S. (2000) A Causal Analysis of Turkish Defence Growth Relationships: 
1924-1996. Ankara University Journal of Political Sciences 55(2), pp. 113–124. 
80. Sezgin, S. (2000) An Empirical Analysis of Turkeys Defense – Growth 
Relationship with a Multi-Equation Model. Defense and Peace Economics 11(1), 
pp. 63-80. 
81. Sezgin, S. (2001) An Empirical Analysis of Turkey's Defence-Growth 
Relationships with a Multi-equation Model (1956–1994). Defence and Peace 
Economics 12(1), pp. 69-81. 
82. Shahbaz, M. (2010) Income Inequality-Economic growth and Non-Linearity: A 
Case of Pakistan. International Journal of Social Economics 37(9), pp. 613-636. 
83. Sivard, R. L. (1977) World Military and Social Expenditure. Leesburg, VA: 
WMSE Publications. 
 38 
84. Smith, J. S and Tuttle, M. H. (2008) Does Defense Spending Really Promote 
Aggregate Output in the United States? Defense and Peace Economics 19(6), pp. 
435-447. 
85. Smith, R. P. (1977) Military Expenditure and Capitalism. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 1(1), pp. 61-76. 
86. Starr, H., F. W. Hoole, J. A. Hart, and Freeman, J. R. (1984) The Relationship 
between Defense Spending and Inflation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(1), pp. 
103-122. 
87. Stewart, D. B. (1991) Economic Growth and the Defence Burden in Africa and 
Latin America: Simulations from a Dynamic Model. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 40(1), pp. 189–207. 
88. Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. (1993) A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors 
in Higher Order Integrated System. Econometrica 61(4), pp. 783-820. 
89. Tahir, R. (1995) Defence Spending and Economic Growth: Re-examining the 
Issue of Causality for Pakistan and India. The Pakistan Development Review 
34(4), pp. 1109-1117. 
90. Tang, C F. (2008) Defence Expenditure and Economic Growth in Malaysia: A 
Reassessment Using Bounds and Modified Wald Tests. The IUP Journal of Public 
Finance 1(2), pp. 45-51. 
91. Taylor, J. B. (2000) Teaching Modern Macroeconomics at the Principles Level. 
American Economic Review 90(2), pp. 90–94. 
92. Ward, M.D., Davis, D., Penubarti, M., Rajmaira, S. and Cochran, M. (1991) 
Military Spending in India – Country Survey. Defence and Peace Economics 3(1), 
pp. 41–63. 
 39 
93. Whynes, D. K. (1979) The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure. 
Palgrave Macmillan. London. 
94. Wijeweera, A. and Webb, M. J. (2009) Military Spending and Economic Growth 
in Sri Lanka: A Time Series Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics 20(6), pp. 
499-508. 
95. Yildirim. J and Öcal, N. (2006) Arms Race and Economic Growth: The Case of 
India and Pakistan. Defence and Peace Economics 17(1), pp. 37-45. 
96. Yildirim. J, S. Sezgin and Öcal, N. (2005) Military Expenditure and Economic 
Growth in Middle Eastern Countries: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis. Defence 
and Peace Economics 16(4), pp. 283-295.  
 
 
